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I INTRODUCTION 
"The foreshore is that area of land which is neither always wet nor always dry due 
to the ebb and flow of the incoming and outgoing tides." 1 The seabed is the submerged 
land between the foreshore and the boundary of New Zealand's territorial sea. In New 
Zealand in 2004, title to the foreshore and seabed is the subject of great legal debate and 
political controversy. 
Recent literature on the foreshore and seabed issue2 has compared the decision of 
the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Attorney-General v Ngati Apa (Ngati Apa)3 to the 
decision of Australia's High Court in Mabo v Queensland (No 2)4. In Australia, Mabo v 
Queensland (No 1 )5 decided that an extinguishment of (at that stage hypothetical) native 
title would be discriminatory. Mabo v Queensland (No 2) established the existence of that 
native title. In New Zealand, Ngati Apa has recognised the possibility of native title in the 
foreshore and seabed, or at least the absence of a general extinguishment of native title. The 
case yet to be heard is New Zealand's Mabo v Queensland (No 1 ), an examination of the 
potentially discriminatory effect of extinguishment of the rights pointed to by Ngati Apa. 
Of course, fundamental constitutional differences between Australia and New 
Zealand mean that the mechanisms for a challenge to discriminatory legislation are 
markedly different. New Zealand's Bill of Rights Act 1990 (BORA), far from being 
supreme law, is a weak piece of legislation gaining much of its force from its symbolism: 
symbolism of lofty ideals and the moral force of international human rights discourse. This 
paper explores the potential of a section 19 Bill of Rights Act discrimination challenge to 
the current Foreshore and Seabed Bill. 
1 Tom Bennion, Malcolm Birdling and Rebecca Paton Making Sense of the Foreshore and Seabed (Maori 
Law Review, Wellington, 2004) 5. While there is variation between the boundaries used to define the 
foreshore and seabed in different contexts (and resultant issues, for example in relation to Crown grants 
bounded by the sea), this definition is sufficient for the purposes of this paper. The Foreshore and Seabed Bill 
2004 no 129-1 defines the foreshore and seabed, in clau e 4, as lying between the mean high water spring tide 
mark and the outer limits of the territorial sea, from the air space above to the bedrock and other matter 
below. 
2 Bennion Making Sense of the Foreshore and Seabed, above n l , l. 
3 Attorney-General v Ngati Apa [2003] NZLR 643 (CA). 
4 Mabo v Q11eenslancl ( No 2) (1992) 175 CLR l. 
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In this paper, an introduction to the relevant human rights legislation, the Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 and Human Rights Act 1993 (HRA), will be given. Background to the 
foreshore and seabed issue and the Foreshore and Seabed Bill (the Bill)6 currently before 
the House will follow. Assessments of the Bill's (non)discriminatory nature will be 
examined. The Waitangi Tribunal said the Bill was not fair. The Attorney-General vetted 
the Bill and found the prima facie discrimination it contained to be a reasonable limit on the 
right to freedom from discrimination. This paper will look at the factors the Court may 
consider when determining a BORA challenge to the Bill. Practical concerns such as 
jurisdictional issues and other options available for rights vindication will be addressed. 
II LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND 
A Interrelation of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Human 
Rights Act 1993 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 lists a series of ri ghts that citizens hold 
against the government, but none of these rights is absolute. Rights are subject to 
reasonable limitation under section 5 of BORA. The Bill of Rights Act is not supreme law 
and accordingly gives the court no power to overturn inconsistent legislation . If a statute is 
found to breach a right even after that right has been subjected to the maximum limitation 
justifiable under section 5, the court can make a declaration of inconsistency. 7 
The Human Rights Act functions as a "detailed working out of section 19 of the 
Bill of Rights" for the purpose of State actors. 8 BORA section 19 states the 1ight of al1 New 
Zealanders to freedom from discrimination on the grounds set out in Part 2 of the Human 
Rights Act 1993 (HRA). One of the prohibited grounds of discrimination set out in that 
Part is "race" . 9 Legislation breaching the BORA section 19 1ight to freedom from 
discrimination can be challenged through the Human Rights Act or directly under BORA. 
5 Mabo v Queensland ( No 1) (1988) 166 CLR 186. 
6 Foreshore and Seabed Bill 2004, no 129-1. 
7 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA). 
8 Paul Rish worth , G Huscroft, S Optican and R Mahoney The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University 
Press, Auckland, 2003) 19. 
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The same BORA standard of reasonable limitation applies to the right whether it 1s 
investigated under the HRA or under BORA. 
Due to the importation of the BORA standard under the HRA, the essential 
differences in a complaint brought under the HRA and a complaint brought under BORA 
are procedural. 10 The material difference is that the ability of the Human Rights Review 
Tribunal to make a declaration of inconsistency, and the effect of such a declaration, are 
made explicit in the HRA. Section 92K(l) of the HRA, like section 4 of BORA, provides 
that the inconsistent enactment is not affected by a declaration. However, HRA section 
92K(2) requires the Minister responsible for the inconsistent Act's administration to report 
to the House that there has been a declaration and to give the House advice on the 
Government's response to the declaration. Whichever Act a challenge is brought under, the 
standards and precedent applied will be those developed in BORA case law. 
B General Bill of Rights Act Interpretation principles 
There is extensive BORA case law setting out the general principles of BORA 
interpretation. There is a well-established principle of broad generous interpretation of 
rights in accordance with the democratic values they represent. 11 The Treaty of Waitangi 
9 Human Rights Act 1993, s 2l(l)(t). 
10 Part lA of the HRA provides in section 20L that BORA rights are to be subject to section 5 BORA 
limitations whether they are investigated under BORA or under the HRA. This is an implicit importation of 
BORA case law. Part 3 of the HRA sets out the procedure to be followed when the Human Rights 
Commission receives a complaint. The Commission is to provide a dispute resolution and mediation service. 
On receipt of a complaint about Crown discrimination, the Commission is to inform all involved parties, 
including the Attorney-General, of the fact of the inquiry and of the process to be followed. The Commission 
is also required to inform the Attorney-General of the substance of the complaint and allow for a response 
from the Attorney-General to the complaint. If settlement cannot be negotiated, civil proceedings can be 
brought before the Human Rights Review Tribunal. These proceedings can be brought by the complainant, 
by an aggrieved person, or by the Commissioner on behalf of an aggrieved person or class. Section 921 
specifically provides the Human Rights Review Tribunal with the power to make declarations of 
inconsistency. Section 921 provides that a declaration of inconsistency is the only remedy available for a 
finding of discrimination in an enactment. 
11 Cooke P has stated that, "Courts will be expected to try to approach the Bill of Rights Act with a sense of 
the democratic values for which the Bill of Rights Act stands."Ministry of Transport v Noort [ 1992) 3 NZLR 
260, 271 (CA). Cooke P also cited Lord Wilberforce's well-known exhortation to avoid "the austerity of 
tabulated legalism". Ministry of Transport v Noort [19921 3 NZLR 260, 258 (CA), citing Lord Wilberforce 
giving the judgment of the Privy Council in Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher [ 1980] AC 319, 328. See also 
Flickinger v Crown Colony of Hong Kong [ 1991] l NZLR 439, 440 (CA), where Cooke P in the judgment of 
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has relevance as an interpretation aid to BORA to the same degree it has for any other 
statute in New Zealand, arguably more so because of the constitutional nature of both 
BORA and the Treaty, particularly when the issue is one of Maori-Crown relations. 
Rish worth suggests that there is room for the Treaty of Waitangi to influence the definition 
of the scope of the right to freedom from discrimination contained in BORA section 
19(1). 12 The Treaty is also relevant as part of the fabric of New Zealand's section 5 "free 
and democratic society". 13 
International human rights jurisprudence is relevant to interpretation, particularly 
because of the Bill of Rights Act's origins. In Quilter v Attorney-General (Quilter), 
Thomas J (dissenting in part) cited the Long Title of BORA's partner Act, the Human 
Rights Act, as evidence of the relevance of international human rights instruments and 
jurisprudence as aids to BORA interpretation.
14 The long title describes the HRA as an Act 
"to provide better protection of human rights in New Zealand in general accordance with 
United Nations Covenants or Conventions on Human Rights." Thomas J approved 
Cartwright J's earlier inference from BORA's international heritage of a requirement of 
broad and generous interpretation. 15 
International jurisprudence is particularly relevant to the interpretation of section 5, 
because New Zealand's section 5 is modelled on section 1 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, which in tum is derived from International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights provisions. 
the Court held Lord Wilberforce's approach to interpretation of constitutional documents to apply to BORA. 
12 Paul Rishworth "Seminar Report: The Treaty of Waitangi and Human Rights" [2003) NZ Law Rev 261, 
277 . 
13 Chi lwell J stated, "There can be no doubt that the Treaty is part of the fabric of New Zealand society" in 
Huakina Development Trust v Waikato Valley Authority [ 1987) 2 NZLR 188, 210 (HC) . 
14 Quilter v Attorney-General [ 1998] l NZLR 523, 530 (CA). 
15 Northern Regional Health Authority v Human Rights Commission [ 1998) 2 NZLR 218, 232-235 (HC) 
Cartwright J. 
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C BORA Section 5 
Section 5 provides that the rights and freedoms contained in BORA "may be 
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in 
a free and democratic society." This is recognition that while no right is absolute, rights 
must be given effect as fully as is reasonable. There is extensive international precedent on 
the application of such limitation clauses, and New Zealand jurisprudence has developed 
along similar lines. 
1 Prescribed by law 
In Ministry of Transport v Noort (Noort), Richardson J16 and Cooke P 17 suggested 
that New Zealand follow Canadian jurisprudence on the meaning of "prescribed by law". 
Accordingly a limitation will be considered to be prescribed by law if it is express or 
necessarily implicit in the terms of a statute or regulation, or in the application of a 
common Jaw rule. This element of section 5 is not at issue in the case of the foreshore and 
seabed legislation. 
2 Reasonable limits demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society 
The cun-ent test used in New Zealand for a reasonable limit justifiable in a free and 
democratic society was stated in Noort by Richardson J. After quoting Canada's Chief 
Justice, Richardson J presented his version of the Canadian test. 18 A materially similar test 
appears in the judgment of the Court in Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review 
(Moonen), again using Canada's R v Oakes test. 19 The proportionality test was summarised 
16 Noort, above n 11, 283, citing R v T/zerens (1985) 18 DLR (4'h) 655 , 680. 
17 Noort, above n 11,272, citing R v Thomsen (1988) 63 CR (3d) 1, 10. 
18 Richardson J deemed section 5 to require a "consideration of all economic, administrative and social 
implications" of both the legislative objective to be achieved by infringing on the right and of the 
infringement itself. He recast the test from R v Oakes [ 1986] l SCR l 03, 138-139 by indicating that New 
Zealand's section 5 required a balance of: 
l the significance of the values underlying the right; 
2 the importance of the public interest in the intrusion on the right; 
3 the degree of the limitation being imposed on the right; and 
4 the effectiveness of the intrusion on the right in achieving its public interest objective. 
Noort, above n 11, 283-284. 
19 The original Canadian Oakes test requires: 
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by Tipping J's memorable statement that "A sledgehammer should not be used to crack a 
nut."20 The Waitangi Tribunal's Petroleum Report provides a succinct summary of the 
section 5 test: 21 
[T]he statutory objective must be sound; the interference in the fundamental right must be 
proportionate to the objective; there must be a proper connection between the interference 
and the objective; and the limitation must be no more than is absolutely necessary. 
In Quilter, Thomas J looked to the1984 Siracusa principles22 on the Limitation and 
Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as 
authority for the proposition that the term "in a democratic society" was to be interpreted 
so as to make it more difficult for rights to have limitations placed on them - rather than 
allowing the democratic society as a justification for infringement on rights to allow 
majority rule.23 
III THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM FROM DISCRIMINATION IN NEW ZEALAND 
AND COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE 
New Zealand case law on the freedom from discrimination is limited. Quilter v 
Attomey-General is the leading New Zealand case dealing with BORA section 19(1), but 
l a sufficiently significant legislative objective; and 
2 the intrusion on the right to be proportionate to the legislative objective, that is: 
a a rational connection between the infringement and the objective; 
b as little infringement on the right as possible; and 
c the infringement to be justified in I ight of the objective. 
R v Oakes, above n 18, 138-139. 
In Moonen, above n 7, 16, Tipping J stated that, taking into account the importance of the legislative 
objective, the Court must be satisfied that: 
l there is a rational connection between the infringement and the objective; 
2 the infringement is proportional to the objective; 
2 the infringement on the right is minimal; and 
4 the infringement is justifiable in light of the objective. 
Tipping J's test is more comprehensive than Richardson J's and better reflects the Oakes test. For further 
comment on the requirement of minimum infringement, see Attorney-General of Hong Kong v Lee 
Kwong-kut [1993) 3 All ER 939,954 (PC). 
20 Moonen, above n 7, 16. 
2 1 Waitangi Tribunal Petroleum Report: Wai 796 (Legislation Direct, Wellington, 2003) 60. 
22 United Nations, Economic and Social Council, U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation of Provisions in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Annex, UN Doc E/CN.4/1985/4 (1985). 
23 Quilter, above n 14, 540-541. 
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does not provide particularly substantial guidance on the application of the section and is of 
little use in the foreshore and seabed context. However, some of the observations made by 
the Court in their judgments are relevant to this case. Gault J defined discrimination as 
generally "understood to involve differentiation by reference to a particular characteristic 
(classification) which characteristic does not warrant the difference." 24 
In Quilter the Court considered whether the restriction of marriage to opposite-sex 
couples was discriminatory under BORA section 19. The Court looked to the way similar 
anti-discrimination provisions had been interpreted in other jurisdictions in relation to 
same-sex couples. Following this precedent of legal methodology, the Court considering a 
BORA section 19 challenge to the foreshore and seabed legislation would need to look at 
the ways discrimination and native title have interacted in comparative jurisprudence. 
A Comparative Disadvantage 
Quilter imported the 'comparative disadvantage' test from Canadian discrimination 
case law. Tipping J discussed the use of a comparator group - a group which would be in a 
position materially the same as that of the group alleging discrimination were it not for the 
alleged discrimination. 25 By comparing the effect of the alleged discrimination on both the 
complainant group and the comparator group, the court should be able to determine 
whether there is in fact a detrimental effect, and therefore prima facie discrimination. As 
Thomas J framed it: 26 
The key question, then, is not whether there is a distinction but whether the distinction 
which exists is based on the personal characteristics of the individual or group and has the 
effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on that individual or group which 
are not imposed on others. 
The comparative disadvantage test overcomes any distinction between direct and 
indirect discrimination by looking past discriminatory intent straight to the effect, but to be 
24 Quilter, above n 14,527. 
25 Quilter, above n 14, 573. 
26 Quilter, above n 14, 573. 
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effective the test relies on the selection of a valid comparator group. Tipping J described 
the need for a "logically relevant" group.27 
B Human Dignity Approach 
Canada's courts have developed the human dignity approach to interpretation of 
human rights legislation. 28 This can be seen as a purposive approach, returning to the core 
purpose of human rights as a means of recognising and promoting human dignity. In 
returning to the right' s genesis, the Canadian Court viewed the right to freedom from 
discrimination as "a guarantee against the evil of oppression," "designed to remedy the 
imposition of unfair limitations upon opportunities, particularly for those persons or 
groups who have been subject to historical disadvantage, prejudice, and stereotyping."29 
This reference to historical disadvantage allows the Court to consider not only the 
discrimination allegedly suffered by the complainant on the facts of the case at bar, but also 
discrimination and disadvantage suffered by the complainant's group historically and in 
contemporary society generally. The approach allows for an examination of 
"powerlessness and vulnerability" within society and emphasises "the importance of 
examining the surrounding social, political, and legal context in order to determine 
whether discrimination exists".30 The adoption of the human dignity approach in New 
Zealand would be of great significance for Maori. It would mean that the hi storical 
disadvantage of Maori 31 would strengthen claims to the right to freedom from 
discrimination. 
The human dignity approach to the right to freedom form disc1imination 1s 
summarised in-Law v Canada: 32 
27 Quilter, above n 14,573. Law v Canada [1999] 1 SCR 497 is authority for allowing the Plaintiff to select 
the comparator group, as happened in Corbiere v Canada [ 1999] 2 SCR 203, and allowing the court to 
"refine" or further define it , as happened in Lovelace v Ontario [2000] 1 SCR 950. 
28 There is a useful discussion of the authorities in Law v Canada, above n 27, 525-531. 
29 Law v Canada, above n 27,525, citing Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia [1989] 1 SCR 143, 
180-181 McIntyre J. 
30 Law v Canada, above n 27,526. 
31 See Te Puni Kokiri statistics <http://www.tpk.govt. nz> (last accessed 28 August 2004). 
32 Law v Canada, above n 27,529. 
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It may be said that the purpose of [the guarantee of freedom from discrimination] is to 
prevent the violation of essential human dignity and freedom through the imposition of 
disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or social prejudice, and to promote a society in 
which all persons enjoy equal recognition at law as human beings or as members of[ . .. ] 
society, equally capable and equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration. 
Legislation which effects differential treatment between individuals or groups will violate 
this fundamental purpose [ ... ] where the differential treatment reflects the 
stereotypical application of presumed group or personal characteristics, or otherwise has 
the effect of perpetuating or promoting the view that the individual is less capable, or less 
worthy of recognition or value as a human being or as a member of[ . . . ] society. 
IV BACKGROUND TO THE FORESHORE AND SEABED ISSUE 
A Attorney-General v Ngati Apa 
While Ngati Apa is the foreshore and seabed case, it is not New Zealand's first. In 
Kawaueranga in 187033 and Ngakororo in 194234 the Native Land Court and the Native 
Appellate Court, respectively, considered title to the foreshore and seabed without finding 
it necessary to distinguish the relevant law from the law applied to dry land. More recently, 
native title to the foreshore and seabed has been precluded by Re the Ninety-Mile Beach,35 
now overruled by N gati Apa. 
The Ngati Apa proceedings began in 1997 at the instigation of eight iwi from the 
top of the South Island who were dissatisfied with the development of marine farming 
under the control of local government. The case progressed through the Maori Land Cou1t, 
Maori Appellate Court, High Court and Court of Appeal. The key issue dealt with in the 
Court of Appeal decision was essentially whether the Ma01i Land Court has jurisdiction to 
investigate title to the foreshore and seabed. The significance of the Court of Appeal's 
finding that the Maori Land Comt has ju1isdiction is that the Maori Land Court can declare 
customary title in the foreshore and seabed under section 131 of Te Ture Whenua Maori 
33 Kauwaeranga (1870) 4 Hauraki MB 236, reprinted (1984) 14 VUWLR 227. 
34 Ngakororo (1942) 12 Auckland NAC 137. 
35 Re the Ninety-Mile Beach (1963) NZLR 261 (CA) . 
II 
1993, and can convert that customary title into freehold title under section 132.36 This 
power creates the possibility of Maori gaining freehold title over parts of the foreshore and 
seabed where customary title can be established to the satisfaction of the Maori Land 
Court. 
The significance of the Court's decision is sometimes understated when viewed 
purely as a matter of statutory interpretation. Although not a declaration, the decision was 
tantamount to an admission that the foreshore and seabed were subject to native title in the 
absence of any beneficial title in the Crown or private individuals. Customary title is 
governed by, and exists in accordance with, tikanga Maori, but is recognised by the 
common law. The existence of customary title is a question of fact for the Maori Land 
Court to determine based on criteria broadly entailing a traditional connection with the land 
which is maintained today. This connection will be by custom and usage. Customary rights 
are held according to tikanga Maori and may extend as far as customary title in areas where 
that degree of customary interest is present on the facts. The Court in Ngati Apa left open 
the possibility of extinguishment of native title in any specific area and ruled out only a 
general extinguishment. It ruled that the Crown's established title in the foreshore and 
seabed was only a radical title. 
Another important aspect of the Ngati Apa decision was the finding that customary 
title to the foreshore and seabed was not automatically extinguished when title to 
contiguous dry land was extinguished. This finding required the overruling of the Court's 
decision in Re the Ninety-Mile Beach. The Cou1t found that the cession of sovereignty gave 
the Crown only the radical title (or imperium) over land, including any foreshore and 
seabed land to which Mao1i may have held customary title. Where Maori had customary 
title, that title existed as a burden on the Crown's radical title. Customary title can only be 
extinguished by consent or in accordance with express statutory authority. However, the 
Court recognised that this would by no means make customary title easy to establish. The 
Court of Appeal judgments downplayed the significance of the decision, in light of the 
36 See Andrew Erueti "Translating Maori Customary Title into a Common Law Title" [2003] NZLJ 421. 
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limited question the Court was answering. 37 
Nevertheless, the significance of the decision was that the claims of Maori to 
customary title in the foreshore and seabed were found to be within the jurisdiction of the 
Maori Land Court and could, and would, be heard, unless the government legislated to 
preclude this occuITence or won an appeal to the Privy Council. The Crown chose not to 
take an appeal or to allow the claims to play out in the court system and instead began to 
develop policy with a view to legislating. 38 
B Title in the Foreshore and Seabed after Ngati Apa 
Following Ngati Apa, the status of foreshore and seabed land is unclear, as are the 
processes for clarifying it. 39 Both the Maori Land Court and the High Court have 
jurisdiction to determine the status of foreshore and seabed land. The Maori Land Court 
has exclusive jurisdiction to effectively convert Maori customary land into Maori freehold 
land.40 Maori Land Court precedent suggests that the Court was willing and able to deal 
with foreshore and seabed land on the same basis as dry land."H However, Tipping J 
adverted to the possibility that the Maori Land Court could have declined to make vesting 
orders creating Maori freehold in the foreshore and seabed, or could have done so only in 
very limited circumstances or with conditions on the title . .i2 
The Maori Land Court and High Court would develop te t for the declaration of 
customary title, and for its conversion to freehold in the in tance of the ),,faori Land Court. 
The likely form of these tests is a matter of much dispute and \\ a con idered before the 
Waitangi Trjbunal in its urgent hearing on the Government" fore hore and eabed 
37 Attorney-General v Ngati Apa, above n 3, para 129 Keith and Anderson JJ 
38 However, another respondent, Port of Marlborough, lodged an appeal ,, 1th the Pm~ Coun ii ,, h1-h 
remains live. 
39 See Richard Boast "Maori Proprietary Claims to the Foreshore and eabed after S _r:aii Ap ·· (2004 21 
NZULR 1, l 0-11. 
40 There is dispute as to whether the Maori Land Court's power under :e-:tlL)n l.:' l to de -lare \laL n 
customary land status is a constitutive power. See .. Maori Proprietar~ Claim.- to the FL)resh re nd ea bed 
after Ngati Apa", above n 39, 11. 
41 See Kauwaeranga, above n 33, and Ngakororo, above n 34. 
42 Attorney- General v Ngati Apa, above n 3, para 196. 
1:; 
policy.43 In his evidence before the Tribunal Paul McHugh advanced the likelihood of a 
"bundle of rights" approach to native title, as applied in Australia. The Waitangi Tribunal 
also accepted McHugh's evidence that the test for native title applied in New Zealand 
would likely retain the preservative nature of the doctrine of native title and accordingly 
some form of continuity test, but not so strict a test as to freeze customary rights in their 
1840 position. 
These tests are of little moment if McHugh's prediction of the significance of 
Commonwealth v Yarmirr44 for determinations of native title in the foreshore and seabed is 
accepted. Before the Waitangi Tribunal, McHugh forecast that New Zealand courts would 
follow the majority decision in Yarmirr that exclusive native title in the sea and seabed was 
unrecognisable at common law. 45 One dissenting judgment in Yarmirr denied the 
possibility of common law recognition of any customary rights in the seabed and is highly 
unlikely to be adopted in New Zealand given the position articulated in Ngati Apa. In 
another dissent, Kirby P proposed the possibility of exclusive title qualified by common 
law rights of public access and so forth. McHugh predicted, and the Waitangi Tribunal 
agreed, that New Zealand's Court of Appeal would be unlikely to adopt Kirby P's 
approach.46 This prediction was essentially based on the nemo dat principle: the Crown's 
inability to grant seabed title that it does not itself hold at common law. The requisite 
underlying assumption that the seabed is a "special juridical space" was challenged by 
claimant counsel in the Waitangi Tribunal. There are arguments against the conclusiveness 
of English common law on the possibility of exclusive title, especially when seeking to 
apply it in the New Zealand context where the Treaty relationship is relevant. 
V THE FORESHORE AND SEABED BILL 
In essence, Ngati Apa raised the possibility of Maori still holding native title in 
some areas below the high tide mark, potentially conve1tible into freehold title. While this 
43 Waitangi Tribunal Report on the Crown's Foreshore and Seabed Policy: Wai 1071 (Legislation Direct, 
Wellington, 2004) 49-61. 
44 Com111011wealth v Yarmirr (2001) 184 ALR 113 (HCA). 
45 Paul McHugh "Brief of Evidence to the Waitangi Tribunal Inquiry into Foreshore and Seabed Issues" ( 13 
January 2004) 25-29. 
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decision came as no surpnse to much of the academic and legal community, the 
government reacted in shock. In what has been described as an appearance of a lack of 
understanding of the decision,47 the government made hasty comments on the decision 
before producing a discussion document. The discussion document released in August 
2003 set out the four main principles on which the government planned to base foreshore 
and seabed legislation. These four principles were access, regulation, protection and 
· 48 certainty. 
The release of the discussion document was followed by a round of hui, presented 
by the government as consultation hui but derided by critics as a charade.49 Rejection of 
Crown policy at these hui was near unanimous. In December further details of the policy 
were released. so The Foreshore and Seabed Bill as introduced represents in large part the 
substance of the policy documents with little alteration. 
The key features of the Bill are the extinguishment of all customary rights in the 
foreshore and seabed, the substitution of different statutory rights, the vesting of the 
foreshore and seabed in the Crown, and the alteration of the High Court and Maori Land 
Court jurisdictions accordingly. The foreshore and seabed vested in the Crown is the 
"public foreshore and seabed", defined by the Bill to mean all foreshore and seabed land 
not subject to a specified freehold interest. 51 
The Bill extinguishes all rights and interests in the foreshore and seabed held at 
46 Report on the Crown's Foreshore and Seabed Policy, above n 43, 50-56 and 60. 
47 See Jim Evans "Untangling the Foreshore" (25 May 2004) <http://www.publicaddress.net> (last accessed 
28 August 2004). 
48 Meaning access for all New Zealanders, regulation by the Crown, protection of Maori customary rights, 
and certainty for the Crown and for users of the foreshore and seabed. Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 
"The Foreshore and Seabed of New Zealand: Protecting Public Access and Customary Rights" (18 August 
2003). 
49 Maori are faced with a difficult dilemma over whether or not to participate in hui which might be seen as 
farcical. The hui are an opportunity to state a viewpoint and potentially engage with the government as 
required by the Treaty partnership principle, but if the good faith is one-sided participation in the hui may 
simply give legitimacy to on inadequate policy formulation process. 
50 The December policy details contained few changes from the August document. The extinguishment of 
title other than native title was no longer being considered. Office of the Deputy Prime Minister "Foreshore 
and Seabed: A Framework" ( 17 December 2003). 
51 Foreshore and Seabed Bill 2004, no 129-1, cl 4. 
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common law and Maori customary law and removes the corre ponding jurisdiction of the 
Maori Land Court and High Court to rule on these rights and intere t . The Bill in tead 
"establishes a comprehensive framework for recognising right and interests in the 
foreshore and seabed".
52 There are three different forms of statutory nght created under the 
Bill: ancestral connection orders from the Maori Land Court. cu tomary rights orders from 
either the High Court or the Maori Land Court, and territorial cu tomary rights declarations 
from the High Court. 
A Ancestral Connection Orders 
Under the Bill, ancestral connection orders will be a ailable from the )..1aori Land 
Court, or directly from the government as a result of negotiation.53 They will recogni e a 
group's ancestral connection to a certain area with a vie\\ to ha\'ing that group take part in 
decisions about that area. Clause 39 of the Bill sets out the te t to be met to qualify for an 
ancestral connection order: 
(l) The Maori Land Court may make an ance tral connection order only if it is 
satisfied that the order will apply to an e tablished and 1dent1fiable group of 
Maori-
(a) whose members are whanaunga; and 
(b) that has had since 1840., and continues to ha\e. an ance'>tral connection to 
the area of the public foreshore and seabed specified in the application. 
(2) The Maori Land Court must have regard to tikanga Maon ,, hen exerc1 ing it 
jurisdiction under subsection (1). 
The stated test is by no means clear, especially the undefined term .. ance tral 
connection", and will require a great deal of development b1 the Court. It appear to be a 
fairly high threshold relative to that used in comparable O\er ea juri diction . particularly 
the Canadian "right to land" approach which has a its tart-point aboriginal title by virtue 
of occupation at acquisition of sovereignty. 5 .. 
52 Foreshore and Seabed Bill 2004, no 129-1 (explanatory note) 1. 
53 See general ly Foreshore and Seabed Bill 2004, no 129-1. cl r-56. 
54 See Delganwukw v Britsh Columbia [1997] 3 SCR JOIO. See al o Jim E,an · omments in Bru e An le: 
"Stakes in the Sand" The Listener (6 May 2004) e\\ Zealand. 
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The value of an ancestral connection order has been questioned. Writing for Te Ope 
Mana a Tai, Annette Sykes suggests that ancestral connection orders offer Maori nothing 
new.55 References to ancestral connection holders are being added to parts of the Resource 
Management Act where iwi authorities currently have rights. 56 This indicates to Sykes that 
iwi authority status already provides all that ancestral connection orders might. Similarly, 
the clause 111 provision for ancestral connection orders to be negotiated directly with the 
Crown is cited as evidence that the same recognition is currently available through the 
Treaty settlement process. 
B Customary Rights Orders 
Customary rights orders will be declarations from the Maori Land Court (for 
Maori)57 or the High Court (for Maori whose claim cannot be brought before the Maori 
Land Court and for non-Maori/8 of a customary use right, not equivalent to any form of 
title. To qualify for an order the applicants must prove that they are an identifiable group 
who have continued to carry out a practice integral to their culture (tikanga Maori in the 
case of applicants to the Maori Land Court) in accordance with their custom, largely 
uninte1rnpted since 1840.59 The test in the Maori Land Court has an extra hoop: Clause 
42(2)(b)(iii) provides that a right is considered extinguished if any right legally 
inconsistent with the right claimed has be,en established. 
The need for customary rights orders is questionable. If the practice is not illegal, 
then no order should be needed to make it possible to continue that practice. Equally, 
Maori interests, including rights of customary practice, should be considered under the 
Resource Management Act as it stands. Additionally, the standard of proof is stringent, 
especially the requirement that the practice be integral to the applicant group's culture. 
This is a standard some customary practices may not meet. The test also does not take into 
55 Annette Sykes" Analysis of the Foreshore and Seabed Bill" <http://www.kahungunu.iwi.nz> (last accessed 
28 August 2004). 
56 Foreshore and Seabed Bill 2004, no 129-1, cls 79-87. 
57 See generally Foreshore and Seabed Bill 2004, no 129-1, cls 35-56. 
58 Foreshore and Seabed Bill 2004, no 129-1, cls 59-61. 
59 See clause 42 for the criteria to be met in the Maori Land Court, and clause 61 for those to be applied in the 
High Court. 
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account the developments in the common law relating to customary rights - especially the 
right to development of customary practice. 60 The Bill's standard effectively freezes 
customary practice as it was in 1840. 
C Territorial Customary Rights Declarations 
Territorial customary rights declarations are declarations the High Court can make 
stating that "a collection of rights" amounting to "a right to exclusive occupation and 
possession of a particular area that is included in the public foreshore and seabed" would 
have existed at common law had the Bill not been enacted. 61 This provision was added to 
the Bill after controversy caused by the removal of the High Court's inherent jurisdiction 
under the initial policy proposals. Although this is not the same as a statement that the 
claimants would have been entitled to a conversion of title to fee simple under Te Ture 
Whenua Maori, it is the Bill's recognition of aboriginal title. The Attorney-General and 
Minister of Maori Affairs are obligated to "enter into discussions" with holders of 
territorial customary rights declarations to "consider the nature and extent of any redress 
that the Crown may give".62 This is the full extent of the Bill 's provision for redress for loss 
of what would at common law have been a right to exclusive occupation and possession. 
The Waitangi Tribunal discussed the use of the term redress, and the difference between 
redress and compensation, considering ' redress to be an unacceptable remedy for a 
contemporary removal of property rights.63 
The usefulness of a territorial customary rights declaration is questionable because 
negotiation with the government can equally be entered into directly without such a 
declaration. Nevertheless, the presence of this clause in the Bill is an implicit 
acknowledgement that there could have been native title rights to exclusive possession , an 
admission that the Crown is generally reluctant to make. 
60 The Bill departs from established international jurisprudence, for example R v Van der Peet [199612 SCR 
507, and New Zealand jurisprudence on the right to development Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board v 
Director-General of Conservation [1995] 3 NZLR 553 . 
61 See generally clauses 28-34. The quotations come from clause 28. 
62 Foreshore and Seabed Bill 2004, no 129-1, cl 33. 
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The use of the term "collection of rights"64 is evocative of the Australian "bundle of 
rights" approach to native title. The list in clause 31 of matters the High Court may take 
into account when determining territorial customary rights declarations includes 
considerations like those used in Australian courts to test for native title. However, these 
references cannot be taken to indicate a complete importation of Australian case law. The 
possibility of the existence of exclusive native title in the foreshore and seabed is contrary 
to the majority decision in Yarmirr that there could not be exclusive native title in the 
seabed. While the Bill points to the application of an Australian bundle of rights approach, 
this is not explicit and there is still uncertainty about the standard of proof set by the Bill. 
VI THE WA/TANG/ TRIBUNAL REPORT 
The Waitangi Tribunal's urgent hearing and resultant Report on the Crown's 
Foreshore and Seabed Policy65 focussed on the substance of the policy rather than the 
process followed to develop that policy. While the Tribunal was looking at the Bill from 
the point of view of consistency with the Treaty of Waitangi, much of its reasoning may 
equally be applied to a section 19 discrimination determination. 
The Waitangi Tribunal dealt with the Treaty of Waitangi consistency of the 
) 
government's foreshore and seabed policy before it had reached Bill stage. The changes 
made and detail added in the transition from policy to Bill are sufficiently insignificant that 
the Tribunal's report remains relevant, despite the fact that many of the changes were at 
least partially in response to the Tribunal's report. 66 The most significant alteration to the 
63 Report on the Crown's Foreshore and Seabed Policy , above n 43, 114 footnote 95 and 136. 
64 Foreshore and Seabed Bill 2004, no 129-1 , cl 28. 
65 Report on the Crown's Foreshore and Seabed Policy , above n 43 . 
66 The Bill abandoned the unclear concept of vesting in the "public domain" that had appeared in the policy 
and substituted the vesting of the foreshore and seabed in the Crown. Vesting in the Crown rather than 
vesting in the undefined "public domain" is more likely to import Treaty principles and obligations and other 
Crown duties (perhaps the developing fiduciary duty doctrine). The Bill refers to ancestral connection and 
not to customary title to avoid the implications of customary title which clearly were not intended by the 
term's use in the Bill. The Bill abandons both the proposed roving commission on Maori customary title and 
the proposed working groups on Maori involvement in coastal marine management, in favour of more direct 
approaches. Customary use rights are available via the High Court to non-Maori who meet the stringent 
criteria (being an identifiable group who have exercised a right integral to that group's character without 
substantial interruption since 1840). Customary use rights are decoupled from ancestral connection orders in 
the Bill. The interrelation of the Bill and the Resource Management Act 1991 was also (immaterially) 
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Bill since the report is perhaps the addition of the territorial customary rights provisions 
purportedly facilitating redress for claims of rights that would have amounted to territorial 
customary rights but for the Bill.67 
In its report the Tribunal did not expressly state that it found the government's 
foreshore and seabed policy to be discriminatory. It instead used the term "unfair", 
stating:68 
The policy is unfair because it treats Maori customary property rights in the foreshore and 
seabed differently from all other rights. [ . .. )All other existing private and public rights are 
protected. Where other classes of private rights amount to ownership there is every 
indication that the rights will be bought following negotiation, or their owners compensated 
for their forcible removal. 
The Tribunal summarises this point: 69 
The policy is in violation of the rule of law, because it takes away the right o f only one class 
of citizens to have their property rights defined by the courts, without consent or a 
guarantee of compensation. 
VII THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S VET 
Section 7 of the Bill of Rights Act requires the Attorney-General to "bring to the 
attention of the House of Representatives any provision in the Bill that appears to be 
inconsistent with any of the rights and freedoms in [the] Bill of Rights" . In the case of a 
government Bill like the Foreshore and Seabed Bill, section 7 requires that the report is 
made on the Bill's introduction to Parliament. Practice has developed that the 
Attorney-General will not alert the House to every prima facie breach of a BORA right or 
freedom, but will instead report only breaches that are not considered to satisfy the section 
5 requirement of demonstrable justifiability in a free and democratic society. Although 
changed . Other changes relate to the appeals process, esplanade reserves and reclamations. 
67 But see Part V C Territorial Customary Rights Declarations regarding the Waitangi Tribunal's comments 
on redress. 
68 Report on th e Crown's Foreshore and Seabed Policy, above n 43, 124. 
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formal reporting to the House under section 7 is rare, every Bill put before the House is 
analysed by the Attorney-General and her staff for BORA consistency. 
In her analysis of the Foreshore and Seabed Bill, the Attorney-General found that 
"there is a significant argument for a prima facie breach"70 of the BORA section 19 right to 
freedom of discrimination in that the Bill discriminates against Maori on the grounds of 
race by treating "the holders of "specified freehold interests" and Maori customary 
landowners differently (the [latter's] rights are extinguished while the [former's] rights are 
preserved)". 71 In applying the test for comparative disadvantage, the Attorney-General 
compares the positions of holders of foreshore and seabed land under "specified freehold 
interests" and under common law customary Maori title. This choice of comparator groups 
may be obscuring the degree of discrimination. By referring to those who own Maori 
customary land, rather than to those who might, but for the Bill, have been able to gain 
freehold title in the foreshore and seabed, the Attorney-General is making reference to a 
group with lesser interests than the maximum available after Ngati Apa. 
The Attorney-General then goes on to justify the discrimination in the Bill as a 
justified limit on the 1ight to freedom from disc1imination, as allowed by BORA section 5. 
She states the test she applies as: "whether the law or action inf1inges the right in question 
'as little as is reasonably possible' ."72 The Attorney-General makes a questionable claim 
that this test is consistent Richardson J's extra-judicial statement that section 5 requires: 73 
[A] utilitarian assessment of the public welfare in determining whether setting reasonable 
limits on a protected right is justified. On its face, that involves a Brandeis brief inquiry 
where the Court undertakes an extensive empirical examination supported by economic, 
69 Report on the Crown's Foreshore and Seabed Policy, above n 43, 124. 
70 Advice provided to the Attorney-General on the consistency of the Foreshore and Seabed Bill 2004 with 
the Bill of Rights Act 1990 (6 May 2004) <http://www.justice.govt.nz> (last accessed 28 August 2004) para 
2.1. 
71 Advice provided to the Attorney-General on the consistency of the Foreshore and Seabed Bill 2004 with 
the Bill of Rights Act 1990, above n 70, para 56. 
72 Advice provided to the Attorney-General on the consistency of the Foreshore and Seabed Bill 2004 with 
the Bill of Rights Act 1990, above n 70, para 50. 
73 Advice provided to the Attorney-General on the consistency of the Foreshore and Seabed Bill 2004 with 
the Bill of Rights Act 1990, above n 70, para 83, citing Sir Ivor Richardson "Rights Jurisprudence - Justice 
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statistical, and sociological data, makes a cost-benefit analysis of the effects of various 
policy choices and chooses the solution which best reflects a balancing of the values 
involved. 
The Attorney-General's section 5 analysis of the Bill seems to be based much more 
on Richardson J's cost-benefit analysis than on the minimal infringement test well 
established in New Zealand and international human rights jurisprudence.74 
In her report the Attorney-General makes reference to Canadian and Privy Council 
decisions suggesting that the courts display deference to the legislature on matters of 
policy.75 However, the Attorney-General recognised United States jurisprudence approved 
in New Zealand in Quilter that where "the proscribed ground of discrimination in issue is 
race, the scrutiny applied by the courts is more searching and, correspondingly, the margin 
of appreciation allowed to the government is narrower".76 
New Zealand's High Court has ruled that the reporting in accordance with section 7 
is a proceeding of Parliament and is accordingly not judicially reviewable.77 However, a 
BORA challenge to the foreshore and seabed legislation would effectively be a 
consideration by the Cou1t of the same substantial matters as considered by the 
Attorney-General. The Court could easily question the weight the Attorney-General places 
in her vet on the need for certainty without providing substantial evidence of costs of 
· 78 uncertainty. 
for All?" in P Joseph (ed) Essays on the Constitution (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 82. 
74 See Part II C 2 Reasonable limits demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society. 
75 Advice provided to the Attorney-General on the consistency of the Foreshore and Seabed Bill 2004 with 
the Bill of Rights Act 1990, above n 70, paras 49-51. 
76 Advice provided to the Attorney-General on the consistency of the Foreshore and Seabed Bill 2004 with 
the Bill of Rights Act 1990, above n 70, para 52. 
77 Mangawaro Enterprises Ltd v Attorney-General (1994] 2 NZLR 451 (HC). 
78 The Attorney-General refers to the "substantial uncertainties created by the Court of Appeal's decision" 
(para 3), stating, "Much policy-making in relation to the foreshore and seabed has, in the past, been based on 
the analysis of the Court in Ninety-Mile Beach" (para 4). Advice provided to the Attorney-General on the 
consistency of the Foreshore and Seabed Bill 2004 with the Bill of Rights Act 1990, above n 70. 
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\ 1ll TllE BSTANTIVE MERITS OF A CLAIM FOR BREACH OF BORA 
SE TION 19 
A Prima Facie Discrimination 
1 Comparative disadvantage 
The prima facie breach of section 19 would appear not to be in issue, given the 
Attorney-General's admission in her report on the Bill.79 However, Deputy Prime Minister 
~lichael Cullen ha emphasised that the Attorney-General conceded only that a prima facie 
breach may exist. 0 The Deputy Prime Minister argued that the line of reasoning finding 
the Bill to be di criminatory "rests upon an assumption that the Crown will not negotiate in 
good faith.'" 1 Because negotiation with the Crown is the only way to gain redress for lost 
property rights. redress is indeed dependent on good faith. The Deputy Prime Minister's 
argument appears to invert the reasoning supporting a finding of prima facie discrimination. 
E\'en without making the assumption Dr Cullen refers to, Maori are being treated 
differently to the general population in that redress for lost customary title is reliant on 
good faith negotiation, meaning compensation is not guaranteed. This weakens customary 
title. increasing its vulnerability relative to specified freehold intcre ts . 
Dr Cullen argues that the limited and incomplete natur or th sorts of Maori 
customary interests that the Bill removes makes their dollar value difficult to determine, 
rendenng negotiation of a combination of financial and other forms of redress most 
appropnate. This argument is likely to be accepted by all parties to a discrimination 
challenge. The Deputy Pnme :viinister then reasons that negotiation must be at the Crown's 
discretion without the veto of a third party because cession of ultimate deci sion-making 
power to an independent body would "inevitably" reduce the nex1btl1ty or redress options. 
Accepting this argument requires the prioritisation of the flex1btl1ty available to the Crown 
7
~ Ad ,1c;e; pr<J 11ded t<J the; Att<1rne;y r;e;ne;ral (Jn the; cCJnsiste;nc y of the Fore;shore; and Se;abcd 8111 2004 with 
he Bill of,, 1grt, Act J ')'J(J , ab<11e; n 70, para 2.1. 
n ffr1n ~v11chael (~ul le;n ( Addre<,s at I luman Kights Commi<,<,1on Spe;ake;rs Forum : I Ju man Rights and the 
f·ore<;hcife and Se;abed, Wellingt<,n, l June; 2004J. 
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when negotiating directly and unsupervised with Maori, over the benefit to Maori of the 
guarantee of redress offered by the authority of a third party to enforce redress. This 
prioritisation is difficult to accept. The parallel Dr Cullen draws with the good faith 
demonstrated by successive governments in Treaty settlement negotiation is also 
unpalatable. Here Dr Cullen seeks to justify the enforcement of a new loss by pointing to 
negotiations that have taken place for past losses . No other sector of society is asked to 
accept so fragile a reward for loss of interests. 
Once discrimination is established, it is necessary to determine the extent of the 
discrimination, by discerning the effect of the legislation on Maori and comparing that 
effect with the effect on a relevant comparator group. To ascertain the effect of the 
legislation on Maori a comparison needs to be made between the position Maori are in 
before the passage of the Bill and the position they would were the Bill to be enacted in its 
current form. 
Deputy Prime Minister Michael Cullen said, "If a bird in the hand is worth more 
than two in the bush, it is most certainly worth more than a mythical bird whose existence 
is very much in doubt."82 While exactly what Maori are to lose under the Bill is unclear, the 
Waitangi Tribunal expressly rejected the Crown contention that the Bill benefits Maori .83 
After Ngati Apa, Maori have no actual title declared in the foreshore and seabed, but the 
potential for that title exists. After Ngati Apa, Maori have the opportunity to take claims in 
the foreshore and seabed to the Maori Land Court or High Court for a declaration of 
customary title. Based on the evidence of Paul McHugh in the Waitangi Tribunal , the 
Courts would develop tests for native title drawing on those used in comparable 
jmisdictions, most likely a combination of Canadian and Australian tests , requiring a 
degree of continuity of connection to the claimed land. McHugh's evidence on the strength 
of the Yannirr precedent against native title in the foreshore and seabed was approved by 
the Tribunal, but ultimately the Tribunal found that if a declaration of customary title was 
obtained, it could under certain circumstances be translated to Maori freehold title by the 
81 Hon Michael Cullen, above n 80. 
82 Hon Michael Cullen, above n 80. 
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Maori Land Court under Te Ture Whenua Maori 1993.84 Under the Bill, this inchoate 
freehold title becomes at best a territorial customary rights order, entitling the holder to 
enter discussions with the Attorney-General and the Minister of Maori Affairs. The only 
Maori property rights in the foreshore and seabed under the Bill are those recognised by 
customary rights orders. 
This loss for Maori is to be compared with the effect of the Bill on a relevant 
comparator group. If the holders of "specified freehold titles" in the foreshore and seabed85 
are used as the comparator group (as is most obvious) it is clear that Maori are suffering a 
comparative disadvantage. Specified freehold titles are not affected by the Bill. Fair 
consideration will be received if they are sold to the Crown. 
2 Human dignity approach 
Adoption of the Canadian human dignity approach to rights interpretation would 
further strengthen the case for a declaration. The Canadian Supreme Court stated in Law v 
Canada: 86 
Human dignity is harmed when individuals and groups are marginalized, ignored, or 
devalued, and is enhanced when laws recognize the full place of all individuals and groups 
within [ ... ] society. Human dignity \.\ithin the meaning of the equality guarantee does not 
relate to the status or position of an individual in society per se, but rather concerns the 
manner in which a person legitimately feels when confronted with a particular law. Does the 
law treat him or her unfairly, taking into account all of the circumstances regarding the 
individuals affected and excluded by the law? 
A human dignity approach to the foreshore and seabed legislation could take into 
account the generations of disadvantage and prejudice suffered by Maori in ew Zealand 
with Crown sanction. A human dignity approach to interpretation would allow for the 
Treaty relationship to become more significant to the determination of discrimination. 
83 Report on the Crown's Foreshore and Seabed Polic), above n 43, xiii. 
84 Report on the Crown's Foreshore and Seabed Policy. above n 43. 75. 
85 These title holders can include Maori. 
86 Law v Canada, above n 27, 530. 
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Taking account of the historical circumstances would mean viewing the Bill in the context 
of alienation of Maori land by Treaty breach.87 Also relevant would be the past of the 
Maori Land Court and its use as a tool of land alienation, making alterations to its 
jurisdiction when it appears to be working in favour of Maori particularly unfair. 
B Section 5 Analysis 
Proceeding on the basis that the Bill is prima facie discriminatory, the issue to be 
decided by the Court would be whether the limit on the right to freedom from 
discrimination contained in the Bill is a reasonable limit justifiable in a free and democratic 
society. This would require the balancing of the extent of the discrimination on one hand 
and the public interest goals to be met by the Bill on the other. This balancing exercise has 
to take place in light of the nature of New Zealand' s free and democratic society. 
Once the Court had established the extent of the infringement on the right, as 
detailed in the initial step of determination of prima facie disc1imination , the significance 
of the values underlying section 19 would need to be considered. The values underlying 
section 19 are of great importance to New Zealanders and to all free and democratic 
societies. Freedom from discrimination is based on democratic ideals of equality and 
fairness. The right to freedom from discrimination requires accordingly fierce protection . 
The significance of these values makes a Court Jess likely to approve infringement on this 
right than on other tights underscored by Jess fundamental values. 
The next factor for the Comt to consider in a section 5 reasonable limitation 
analysis is the significance of the legislative objectives of the Bill. The aftermath of the 
release of the Ngati Apa decision showed that public access to the foreshore and seabed 
(although often inaccurately and emotively presented as access to beaches) is considered 
by the wider New Zealand public to be a matter of great importance, indeed a "right".88 
Another goal of the Bill is to remedy uncertainty by clarifying title in the foreshore and 
87 Especially the raupatu of the 1860s. 
88 As illustrated by the "Beaches for All" campai gn mounted by the National Party . 
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seabed in order to facilitate management of the area under the Resource Management Act 
1991 and other controlling statutes. The significance of this goal is disputed. The Crown 
contends that the costs associated with waiting for certainty to be achieved without 
legislation will be great. 89 While this is a matter on which no conclusive evidence is 
available, some concrete fears have been expressed about the economic risks associated 
with the foreshore and seabed fracas. 90 Deputy Prime Minister Michael Cullen spoke of 
threats to the operation of the Resource Management Act posed by claims hapu and iwi.91 
In the explanatory note to the Bill it is stated that 2500 coastal permits are issued annually 
under the Resource Management Act 1991. The explanatory note states that concerns that 
without legislation these consents would be decided against an uncertain legal background 
with regional councils not knowing whether they could grant consents before the 
resolution of title. 
It is interesting to note that in British Columbia analysis has shown that it is 
economically viable for the government to take the requisite time to negotiate Treaty 
settlements acceptable to the local indigenous population, even taking into account 
revenues forgone in the interim on Crown land subject to negotiation.92 
Broadly, the Bill achieves all the policy goals set out in the August policy proposals, 
satisfying the requirement of "effectiveness of intrusion". The achievement of these goals 
is not, however, as absolute as government representations might suggest. The right of 
access contained in clause 6 is limited to the "public" foreshore and seabed, excluding all 
areas of the foreshore and seabed covered by specified freehold interests. Notably, the 
access right is a right "in, over, or across" the public foreshore and seabed, not an access 
89 Martin v Tauranga District Court [ 1995] l NZLR 491, 497-498 (HC) Blanchard J is authority for the 
proposition that administrative convenience or budgetary constraints are not justification for abrogating a 
right. 
9° Kevin Taylor "Government Moves to Allay Fear Over Seabed Bill" (10 August 2004) The New Zealand 
Herald Auckland. 
91 Hon Michael Cullen, above n 80. 
92 See Government of British Columbia Treaty Negotiations Office <http://www.prov.gov.bc.cz/tnol> (last 
accessed 28 August 2004), where Premier Mike Harcourt is quoted as saying on l December 1995 in an 
address to the Premier's Working Session on Treaties, Vancouver, British Columbia, "It is clear to me that the 
benefits ... in self-reliance for aboriginal communities, in certainty and security for us all ... in a fairer, 
economically more-prosperous province .. . far outweigh the costs." 
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tight "to" the foreshore and seabed (much to the relief of Federated Farmers as a 
representative of the owners of much of the land adjacent to the foreshore and seabed).93 
Clauses 21 and 24 of the Bill allow for the Crown to place regulatory limitations on access. 
Clause 12 allows the alienation of the foreshore and seabed by special Act of Parliament or 
under certain Resource Management Act provisions.94 
Accepting the intrusion's effectiveness, there is an issue as to the degree of 
intrusion on the right. Issues of proportional and minimal intrusion would come to the fore. 
In looking at the proportionality of an intrusion on a right in relation to the interest 
the intrusion serves, it is necessary to consider other ways in which the public policy 
interest could have been met with less or no infringement on the right at issue. Numerous 
suggestions have been put forward. The Waitangi Tribunal made six suggestions.95 The 
first was a "longer conversation": delaying decision making to allow for consultation and 
consensual compromise. The second was to "do nothing", allowing the claims for title to 
play out without legislative intervention . The third option was more limited legislative 
intervention, legislating perhaps only for public access and inalienability. The Tribunal's 
third suggestion was an improvement to the Courts ' "tool kit" - perhaps by creating a 
customary interest registration system. The Tribunal also adopted Sir Hugh Kawharau ' s 
recommendation of the method used in Ngati Whatua's rohe to recognise the mana of the 
iwi in a management framework for land. The Tribunal's sixth suggestion was the 
adaptation of the schemes used for lakebeds. 
The lack of guaranteed just compensation under the Bill for the loss of rights is a 
further discriminatory aspect and does not go towards achieving any of the stated 
legislative objectives. 96 Compensation on just terms could be guaranteed by the 
93 Clause 6(2) contains the words "in , over, or across". The reaction of Federated Farmers President Tom 
Lambie is reported in Bruce Ansley, above n 54. 
94 Clause 12 is framed as a prohibition on the alienation of the foreshore and seabed with these two 
exceptions. Arguably parliamentary sovereignty precludes Parliament from binding future Parliaments not to 
alienate the foreshore and seabed and this clause is just recognition of that reality . 95 Report on the Crown's Foreshore and Seabed Policy, above n 43 , 138-143. 96 See Report on the Crown's Foreshore and Seabed Policy, above n 43, 143. 
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intr duction of indep ndent arbitration. 
On this anal is the Courts would have ample room to declare the foreshore and 
eabed legi lation incon istent with BORA ection 19. A declaration of inconsistency is 
the primar remedy available for legislation found to breach a BORA right. 9' While 
juri prudence i de eloping regarding awards of damages for BOR breache .9 there is 
no indication that damages would be considered for breach of BORA by valid legislation. 
IX THE COURTS' JURISDICTION TO ASSESS A BILL FOR BORA 
CONSISTENCY 
In Te Runanga o Wharekauri Rekohu Inc v A-G (Wharekauri). the Court of Appeal 
found "an established principle of non-interference by the Court in parliamentary 
proceedings. "99 The Court in Wharekauri did not provide deci i ve guidance on the ba is 
and status of the principle or rule, but was certain that it extended to preventing the Coun 
from interfering in the presentation of a Bill to Parliament b)- a ~lini ter. 110 Be au e the 
Foreshore and Seabed Bill has already been introduced, the Wlwrekauri ratio I not dire tly 
on point. The relevance of the decision in Wharekauri to the juri diction of a. 'e\\ Zealand 
court to make a determination on the BORA status of a Bill lies in the ba i of the rule. 
which can be seen discussed in Eastgate v Ro::.zo!i. 10 ' In a comprehen ive sur\'ey of the 
relevant authorities in common law jurisdictions, Kirby P acknO\\ !edged that it i not 
unheard-of for the courts or the legislature to intrude on the other' internal arrangement 
but stated that it was rarer (and likely to remain so) for the intervention to be on the part of 
the courts. 102 The Court in Wharekauri (citing Eastgate ,, Ro::.::.oli) stated that "the proper 
time for challenging an Act of a representative legi lature, if there are any relevant 
97 Moonen, above n 7. 
98 See for example Simpson v Attorney-General ( Baigent ·s Case) [ 1994] 3 1 ZLR 667 (CA). 99 Te Runanga o Wharekauri Reko/111 Inc v Attorney-General [1993] 2 NZLR 301, 307 (CA). See the extra-judicial comments of the Rt Hon Dame Sian Elias in Sian Elias ··Sovereignty in the 21st Century: Another Spin on the Merry-Go-Round" (Address to the Institute for Comparative and International Law, University of Melbourne, 2003) 12-13. 
100 Wharekauri, above n 99, 308. 
101 Eastgate v Rou.oli (1990) 20 SWLR 188 (CA). 
102 Eastgate v Ro::.zoli, above n 101, 193. 
29 
limitations, is after the enactment." 103 
It could be argued that because the Court would only be making a declaration of 
inconsistency under BORA, and not exercising a power to strike down legislation or 
asserting a power to prevent the passage of a Bill , the reasoning in the above cases is less 
applicable. This argument is likely to be unappealing to a New Zealand Court, especially 
taking into account pragmatic concerns like the increased assertion of parliamentary 
sovereignty by the House and the apparent fragility of constitutional conventions 
supporting the separation of powers. In Eastgate v Rozzali Kirby P considered the fact that 
the Court might have "grave difficulty" enforcing an order restraining the Parliament from 
presenting a Bill for the Royal Assent. 104 This practical consideration indicates the high 
degree of pragmatism likely to be at work in judgments involving potential interference in 
the realm of another branch of government. 
It would appear that the earlier in the progress of the Bill through Parliament a 
declaration of inconsistency was available, the more useful that declaration would be to the 
legislative process . However, the role of checking for BORA consistency before enactment 
has been given to the Attorney-General under BORA. Because this is a non-reviewable 
power, a Court challenge to the foreshore and seabed legislation can only proceed after 
enactment. 
X OTHER FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED 
A BORA Section 6 
A BORA-consistent reading of the legislation may be attempted in accordance with 
BORA section 6. This is unlikely to be successful because the discriminatory aspects of the 
Bill are integral parts of it. A meaning adopted under section 6 in order to read a provision 
as consistent with BORA must not be a "strained" meaning. 105 The wealth of external aids 
to interpretation of the legislation - including the Bill's explanatory note - precludes any 
103 Wharekauri, above n 99, 308. 
104 Eastgate v Rozzoli , above n 101, 193. 
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interpretation of the legislation that does not contain its discriminatory aspects. 
B Other Possibilities for a Section 19 Challenge 
There are wider issues that could be considered in the scope of a challenge to the 
foreshore and seabed legislation on discrimination grounds. The essentially weak nature of 
common law native title and its deference to conflicting interests is a significant issue -
perhaps of a more global nature. Within the Bill the prominence of conflicting 
non-indigenous rights over Maori customary rights is perhaps independent cause for 
challenge on grounds of discrimination. A discrimination challenge may also be possible 
on the grounds that the Bill places some iwi at a disadvantage relative to other iwi. Due to 
the preservative nature of native title at common law, the Bill will ultimately provide 
stronger claims to the coastline for iwi who have retained ownership of the contiguous land. 
Those iwi who have lost contiguous land through Treaty breaches will have the effect of 
the historical loss intensified because it will translate to a weaker claim in the foreshore and 
seabed under the Bill. While this comparative disadvantage stems more from the nature of 
native title than from the provisions of the Bill, thi s is no justification for the Bill's 
perpetuation of this discriminatory effect. The Bill establishes "a new legal scheme"
106 
which surely has room for innovative approaches to issues of discrimination in the 
common law. 
C Other BORA Rights Threatened by the Bill 
Other BORA rights potentially affected by the Bill are the section 20 right to 
minority culture, the section 21 right to freedom from unreasonable seizure and the section 
27 right to natural justice. The Attorney-General has di smissed these potential breaches 
much more easily than she dismissed the prima facie breach of section 19. She did so by 
interpreting section 20 as satisfiable without title, section 21 as a protection of privacy 
rather than property and section 27 as a guarantee of merely procedural equality. The 
Attorney-General's easy dismissal of these potential breaches is an indication that these 
claims have a more limited likelihood of success than does a section 19 action. 
105 Noort , above n 11 , 272 (CA) Cooke P. 
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D Recourse to International Human Rights Bodies 
Maori recourse to international human rights bodies is obviously a possibility 
considered by the Attorney-General. 107 The Bill is already being challenged in 
international human rights protection fora. In its sixty-fifth session, the United Nations 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 108 sent a letter to the New Zealand 
government requesting information on the Bill by 20 September 2004. 109 This is a strong 
indication that the Committee will pass comment on the Bill. The potential breaches of 
human rights contained in the Bill have also been brought to the attention of the United 
Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 110 the United Nations Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations 111 and the United Nations High Commissioner on Human 
Rights. 112 International attention to human rights breaches raises the international and 
domestic profile of the discriminatory action and puts pressure on the government. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider the prospects for challenges to the 
legislation other than under BORA section 19, but these possibilities are being considered 
and pursued by iwi advocates and need to be taken into account when contemplating 
challenges to the legislation. 
XI CONCLUSION 
While certainly a landmarkjudgment, Ngati Apa did not have to become the kind of 
106 Foreshore and Seabed Bill 2004, no 129-1, cl 3. 
'
07 Advice provided to the Attorney-General on the consistency of the Foreshore and Seabed Bill 2004 with 
the Bill of Rights Act 1990, above n 70, para 102. 
'
08 The Taranaki Maori Trust Board made a submission to this Committee in early August. "Taranaki Maori 
Take Seabed Issue to UN" (10 August 2004) <http://www.stuff.co.nz> (last accessed 28 August 2004). 
'
09 United Nations "Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Concludes Sixty-Fifth Session" 
(20 August 2004) Press Release. 
110 Ngai Tahu were heard at the Forum earlier this year. Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu "Ngai Tahu Takes Case to 
the United Nations" (11 May 2004) Press Release. 
111 The Aotearoa Indigenous Rights Trust has tabled an intervention with the Working Group. Aotearoa 
Indigenous Rights Trust "Aotearoa Indigenous Rights Trust, Tuhoe Nation and International Indian Treaty 
Council Joint Statement" (23 July 2004) Press Release. 
112 Mana Motuhake representatives contacted the Commissioner in May with a view to an investigation 
"Seabed Issue to be Considered by UN Body" (4 May 2004) The New Zealand Herald Auckland. 
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decision that breeds talk of civil war. The intense politicisation of the issues raised has 
lifted the stakes in the debate beyond those of foreshore and seabed control. In this 
environment, a section 19 Bill of Rights Act challenge to the discriminatory aspects of the 
Government's Foreshore and Seabed Bill is without doubt an option being considered. 
The Human Rights Commission declined to address a complaint under the Human 
Rights Act before the Bill was introduced, and the Courts would almost certainly refuse to 
hear a challenge until after the Bill's enactment. On the analysis contained in this paper, a 
section 19 challenge to the legislation would be successful after enactment. The Foreshore 
and Seabed Bill is an unnecessary sledgehammer when so many other nut-cracking devices 
are available and there is not consensus that the nut needs to be cracked at all. Adoption of 
the Canadian human dignity approach to rights interpretation would only increase the 
chances of the complainants' success by increasing the perception of infringement on the 
right to freedom from discrimination, thereby making the infringement extremely difficult 
to justify. 
Should the Court find a breach of the Bill of Rights, a declaration of inconsistency 
would be the only remedy available. In itself, a declaration is only a "lawyers' remedy". 
Ultimately the importance of a declaration would be the Government reaction. It is 
possible that the Government would elect to follow the steps set out in the Human Rights 
Act for responding to declarations and would draw the matter to the attention of the House 
and recommend action. The Government response would be of constitutional significance, 
especially in light of the trend towards assertions of parliamentary sovereignty by MPs' 
words and by Government action . 
In essence, a BORA section 19 challenge to the foreshore and seabed legislation 
probably has very little to offer Maori . After the Bill is enacted it would be too little, too 
late. The value of a declaration would its usefulness as evidence - in international human 
rights fora, in the media, and in the future. Instead, progress needs to be made before the 
passage of the Bill. The CERD Committee's request to the Government for information on 
the Bill is a sign of such progress. 
33 
XII BIBLIOGRAPHY 
A Table of Cases 
Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia [1989] 1 SCR 143. 
Attorney-General v Ngati Apa [2003] NZLR 643 (CA). 
Attorney-General of Hong Kong v Lee Kwong-kut [1993] 3 All ER 939 (PC). 
Commonwealth of Australia v Yamiirr [1999] FCA 1668. 
Corbiere v Canada [1999] 2 SCR 203. 
Delgamuukw v Britsh Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 1010. 
Eastgate v Rozzoli (1990) 20 NSWLR 188 (CA). 
Flickinger v Crown Colony of Hong Kong [1991] 1 NZLR 439 (CA). 
Huakina Development Trust v Waikato Valley Authority [1987] 2 ZLR 188 (HC). 
James Wharehuia Milroy v Attorney-General [2003] NZCA 97. 
Kauwaeranga (1870) 4 Haurala MB 236, rep1inted (1984) 14 VUWLR 227. 
Law v Canada [1999] 1 SCR 497. 
Lovelace v Ontario [2000] l SCR 950. 
Mabo v Queensland (No 1) (1988) 166 CLR 186. 
Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
Mangawaro Enterprises Ltd v Attorney-General [1994] 2 NZLR 451 (HC) . 
Martin v Tauranga District Court [1995] l NZLR 491 (HC). 
Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher [1980] AC 319. 
Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260 (CA). 
Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA). 
Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board v Director-General of Conservation [ 1995) 3 NZLR 553. 
34 
Ngati Apa v Attorney-General [2003] 3 NZLR 643 (CA). 
Northern Regional Health Authority v Human Rights Commission [1998] 2 NZLR 218 
(HC). 
Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] l NZLR 523 (CA). 
R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103. 
R v Therens (1985) 18 DLR (41h) 655 (SCC). 
R v Thomsen (1988) 63 CR (3d) 1 (SCC). 
R v Van der Peet [1996] 2 SCR 507. 
Re the Ninety-Mile Beach [1963] NZLR 261 (CA). 
Rediffusion (Hong Kong) Ltd v Attorney-General of Hong Kong [1970] AC 1136 (PC 
Hong Kong). 
Simpson v Attorney-General (Baigent's Case) [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA). 
Te Runanga o Wharekauri Rekohu Inc v Attorney-General [1993] 2 NZLR 301 (CA). 
Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer [1986] 1 NZLR 680 (HC). 
Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373. 
Western Australia v Ward (2002) 191 ALR l (HCA). 
Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1. 
35 
B Primary Sources 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Ju tice Commi sioncr "Native Title Repo11 
_OOO: Report to the Attorney-General a required by ection 46 (1 )(a) Human Ri 0 hts and 
Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986" <http://, ww.hreoc.gov.au> (last access d 2 
August 2004). 
Advice provided to the Attorney-General on the consistency of the Foreshore and Seabed 
Bill 2004 with the Bill of Rights Act 1990 (6 May 2004) <http://www.justice.govt.nz> (la t 
accessed 28 August 2004). 
Aotearoa Indigenous Rights Trust "Aotearoa Indigenous Rights Trust, Tuhoe Nation and 
International Indian Treaty Council Joint Statement" (23 July 2004) Press Release. 
Boast, Richard "The Foreshore: A Report to the Waitangi Txibunal" (Rangahaua Whanui 
Series Theme Q, Wellington, 1996). 
Charters, Claire and Andrew Erueti "The Treaty - Mapping the Issues" (Public Seminar. 
Victoria University of Wellington, 4 June 2004). 
Cullen, Michael (Address at Human Rights Commission Speakers Forum: Human Rights 
and the Foreshore and Seabed, Wellington, 1 June 2004). 
de Bres, Joris, Race Relations Commissioner "Cun-ent Issues in Race Relations" (Address 
to the New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Victoria University of Wellington, 16 March 
2004). 
ECOSOC Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Mmont1es 
"Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation of Provisions in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" (1985) E/CN.4/1985/4. 
Elias, Sian "Sovereignty in the 21 51 Century: Another Spin on the Merry-Go-Round" 
(Address to the Institute for Comparative and International Law, University of Melbourne, 
2003). 
Epstein, Richard "A Discussion on the Foreshore and Seabed Issue" (Address to the New 
Zealand Centre for Public Law, Victoria University of Wellington, 2 August 2004). 
Foreshore and Seabed Bill 2004, no 129-1. 
Foreshore and Seabed Bill 2004, no 129-1 (explanatory note). 
Government of British Columbia Treaty Negotiations Office 
<http://www.prov.gov.bc.cz/tno/> (last accessed 28 August 2004). 
Human Rights Act 1993. 
36 
McHugh, Paul "Brief of Evidence to the Waitangi Tribunal Inquiry into Foreshore and 
Seabed Issues" (13 January 2004). 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
New Zealand Government Foreshore and Seabed Consultation 
<http://www.beehive.govt.nz/foreshore> (last accessed 28 August 2004). 
New Zealand Government "Foreshore and Seabed: Policy Refinements Since December" 
(7 April 2004) Press Release. 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister ''The Foreshore and Seabed of New Zealand: 
Protecting Public Access and Customary Rights" (18 August 2003). 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister "Foreshore and Seabed: A Framework" (17 
December 2003). 
Resource Management Act 1991 
Rishworth, Paul "Seminar Report: The Treaty of Waitangi and Human Rights" [2003] Z 
Law Rev 261. 
"Seabed Issue to be Considered by UN Body" (4 May 2004) The New Zealand Herald 
Auckland. 
"Taranaki Maori Take Seabed Issue to UN" (10 August 2004) <http://www.stuff.co.nz> 
(last accessed 28 August 2004). 
Taylor, Kevin "Government Moves to Allay Fear Over Seabed Bill" (10 August 2004) The 
New Zealand Herald Auckland. 
Te Ope Mana a Tai <http://www.teope.co.nz> (last accessed 28 August 2004). 
Te Puni Ko kiri <http://www.tpk.govt.nz> (last accessed 28 August 2004). 
Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu "Ngai Tahu Takes Case to the United Nations" (11 May 2004) 
Press Release. 
Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993. 
United Nations "Committee on the Elimination of Racial Disc1imination Concludes 
Sixty-Fifth Session" (20 August 2004) Press Release. 
Waitangi Tribunal Petroleum Report: Wai 796 (Legislation Direct, Wellington, 2003). 
37 
Waitangi Tribunal Report on the Crown's Foreshore and Seabed Policy: Wai 1071 
(Legislation Direct, Wellington, 2004). 
C Secondary Sources 
Ansley, Bruce "Stakes in the Sand" The Listener (6 May 2004) New Zealand. 
Bennion, Tom, Malcolm Birdling and Rebecca Paton Making Sense of the Foreshore and 
Seabed (Maori Law Review, Wellington, 2004). 
Boast, Richard "Constitutional Crisis Over Foreshore and Seabed In Aotearoa" (2004) 7 
Pacific Ecologist 60. 
Boast, Richard "Maori Proprietary Claims to the Foreshore and Seabed after Ngati Apa" 
(2004) 21 NZULR 1. 
Brookfield, Jock "Maori Customary Title to Foreshore and Seabed" [2003] NZU 295. 
Cavanagh, Paul "The Foreshore and Seabed Controversy" [2003] NZU 428. 
Erueti, Andrew "Translating Maori Customary Title into a Common Law Title" [2003] 
NZU 421. 
Evans, Jim "Untangling the Foreshore" (25 May 2004) <http://www.publicaddress.net> 
(last accessed 28 August 2004). 
Jackson, Moana "A Primer on the Foreshore and Seabed" <http:www.kahungunu.iwi.nz> 
(last accessed 28 August 2004). 
Rishworth, Paul, G Huscroft, S Optican and R Mahoney The New Zealand Bill of Rights 
(Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2003). 
Sykes, Annette "Analysis of the Foreshore and Seabed Bill" 
<http://www.kahungunu.i wi .nz> (last accessed 28 August 2004 ). 
LAW LIBRARY 
A Fine According to Library 
Regulations is charged on 
Overdue Books. 
VICTORIA 
UNIVERSITY 
OF 
WELLINGTON 
LIBRARY 
AS741 
vuw 
A66 
N876 
2004 

